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The Baby and the Bathwater Too:
A Critique of American Library Ass’n v. U.S.
Marc H. Greenberg •

Abstract
In June 2003, the Supreme Court, in United States v. American Library Ass’n, sent
tremors through libraries nationwide when it reversed a finding of the United States
District Court (USDC) in Philadelphia that held the Child Internet Protection Act (CIPA)
was facially violative of the First Amendment rights of library patrons. Under CIPA, all
libraries that accepted federal funding to cover the costs of providing Internet access to
their patrons were required to install filtering software programs on their computers to
prevent patrons from seeing any material that was obscene or “harmful to minors.” The
law was not limited to computers used solely by children – computers used by adult
patrons, and even staff, were affected. The American Library Association (ALA) had
objected to CIPA on the grounds that the broad scope of such filtering programs
prevented patrons from exercising their First Amendment right to see materials which
were not unlawful, but which the filters prevented them from accessing.
The ALA challenged the constitutionality of CIPA in an action filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The District Court, aided by extensive
evidence developed by expert testimony, and applying a strict scrutiny standard, agreed
with the ALA and found that CIPA was, on its face, violative of the First Amendment
rights of library patrons. The government, utilizing the right, under the Act, to immediate
appeal to the Supreme Court, sought a reversal of the District Court determination. On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that strict scrutiny was not mandated, and
that CIPA, viewed under an intermediate scrutiny standard, was not unconstitutional on
its face. The Court left open the possibility that CIPA might still be overly restrictive as
applied, meaning that the door was still open for subsequent claims to be brought to
modify the scope of the statute.
An analysis of this Supreme Court decision is the focal point of this article. In the first
section, I look at the history of Congress’ deeply flawed effort to define and regulate
obscenity in the pre-digital age, and the judicial response to those efforts. In Section
Two, the migration of this effort into the digital age is examined, as I review Congress’
determined efforts to apply an already flawed standard to the complex universe of
cyberspace. Those efforts, found in the Communications and Decency Act (CDA), and
the Children’s Online Protection Act (COPA), also ran afoul of the Supreme Court and
were limited or invalidated on overbreadth and First Amendment grounds. The lessons
learned from these failures give birth to CIPA, and this section includes a summary of its
relevant provisions.
•
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The Third Section of this article focuses on judicial review of CIPA, beginning with the
decision in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Fourth Section
analyzes the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion reversing the District Court and
upholding CIPA.
The fifth and final section of the article poses the perennial “what next” question. How
will libraries respond to the challenge posed by the over- and under-inclusiveness of the
software filters mandated by CIPA, and is it likely that an “as-applied” challenge to the
law will modify or ultimately lead to a subsequent review of the validity of the Supreme
Court decision?

Introduction
Fog everywhere. Fog up the river, where it flows among green aits and meadows;
fog down the river, where it rolls defiled among the tiers of shipping, and the
waterside pollutions of a great (and dirty) city…
….
The raw afternoon is rawest, and the dense fog is densest, and the muddy
streets are muddiest, near that leaden-headed old obstruction, appropriate
ornament for the threshold of a leaden-headed old corporation: Temple Bar. And
hard by Temple Bar, in Lincoln’s Inn Hall, at the very heart of the fog, sits the
Lord High Chancellor in his High Court of Chancery.
….
Never can there come fog too thick, never can there come mud and mire
too deep, to assort with the groping and floundering condition which this High
Court of Chancery, most pestilent of hoary sinners, holds, this day, in the sight of
heaven and earth. 1
With these immortal words, Charles Dickens, in Bleak House, uses the metaphor of fog
to begin his scathing critique of the ambiguities and uncertainties lurking in the British probate
system. The metaphor applies with equal strength to the decades-old efforts of the U.S. legal
system to define, and then regulate the distribution of adult-oriented material in popular media.
It is an effort rife with uncertain definitions, and its vagueness has cost the parties involved their
reputations, businesses, and more.
The most recent efforts to regulate adult-oriented material have focused on the public
library system in the United States, and the efforts of that system to provide Internet access to its
patrons. After two failed legislative efforts to regulate the exposure of children to explicit sexual
material, Congress finally seems to have met with success in the form of the Children’s Internet
Protection Act, popularly known as CIPA. 2
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CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 1-2 (Bantam Classics ed., Penguin Books 1983) (1853).
47 U.S.C. § 254 (2005); 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2005).
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I.
Background: A History of Fog – Obscenity Decisions in U.S.
Jurisprudence
In order to understand the current cases in which Congress and the Supreme Court are
attempting to regulate the dissemination of adult oriented material in the online context, we need
to dial the time machine back to 1957, when in Roth v. U.S. 3 the Court first squarely confronted
the issue of what “obscenity” is. In my review of these early obscenity cases, I was struck once
again by the verity of the statement attributed to George Santayana, that “those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” 4
The defendant in Roth had been convicted for mailing an obscene book and obscene
circulars and advertising. 5 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, noted that this case was the
first time that the question of whether obscenity was protected speech under the First
Amendment had been squarely presented to the Court; prior cases had suggested that obscenity
was not protected speech. 6
Based on this history, and noting that “the unconditional phrasing of the First
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance” 7 , the Court held that obscenity was not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press. 8 Justice Brennan was aware that
there was a fine line to be drawn between material that dealt with sexual matters, and material
that was obscene. He noted that making this delineation was necessary because of the importance
of protecting individuals’ right of free speech in all such matters of public concern. 9
With these concerns in mind, the Court in Roth spelled out a standard for determining
whether sexually oriented material was obscene, and therefore devoid of First Amendment
protection. The test was “whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.” 10

3

Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
George Santayana, Life of Reason, Reason in Common Sense, SCRIBNERS (1905) at 284.
5
Roth, 354 U.S. at 481.
6
Id. at 481 (citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877); United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255, 261 (1890);
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1852), and other citations omitted).
7
Roth., 354 U.S. at 483.
8
Id.at 485. This sweeping pronouncement of the Roth majority forms the basis of obscenity law in the United
States to this day. It was accompanied, as is illustrated by the dissenting opinions of Justices Harlan, Douglas and
Black, with serious concerns over the lack of a clear definition of obscenity, or any agreement as to what community
would be empowered to create that definition.
9
Id. at 487. Justice Brennan wrote eloquently that “[s]ex and obscenity are not synonymous...The portrayal of sex,
e.g. in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection
of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a
subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and
public concern.” Id.
10
Id.at 488. In announcing this test, the Court rejected the early leading standard of obscenity, set forth in Regina v.
Hicklin, (1868) L.R.3 Q.B. 360, which found material obscene if even an isolated excerpt had a deleterious effect on
particularly susceptible persons.
4
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Citing the instructions of the trial court in Roth, Justice Brennan adopted the trial judge’s
definition of the community as follows:
The test in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publication considered as
a whole, not upon any particular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to
reach. In other words, you determine its impact upon the average person in the
community….In this case, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you and you alone are
the exclusive judges of what the common conscience of the community is, and in
determining that conscience you are to consider the community as a whole, young
and old, educated and uneducated, the religious and irreligious–men, women and
children. 11
Determining what the contemporary community standards were in California (where
Roth was tried and convicted) was no easy task. The state at that time comprised a diverse
population, with large concentrations of Mexican and Mexican-Americans in the southern
portion, and a large population of Chinese, Japanese, and Portuguese citizens in the north.
Liberal politics and social mores were found in San Francisco and Los Angeles, and more
conservative views were the mainstay of Sacramento and San Diego. It was, however, an era
easier to define than contemporary California, since it was a time when commercial air travel
was in its early stages, television was a nascent industry, and the border-collapsing invention of
the Internet was a distant dream. Looking back from our vantage point in history, it seems more
likely that a jury then, as opposed to now, could come up with a formula that it believed was
reflective of contemporary community standards. To attempt that effort now, in an era of
increased diversity of population and viewpoints, seems an impossibility.
In his dissent in Roth, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, voiced concerns about the
viability of the “community standard” and about the impact the Court’s ruling would have on the
First Amendment:
The standard of what offends “the common conscience of the community”
conflicts, in my judgment, with the command of the First Amendment that
“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”
Certainly that standard would not be an acceptable one if religion, economics,
politics or philosophy were involved. How does it become a constitutional
standard when literature treating with sex is concerned? 12
The Roth standard was tested and expanded in the years that followed. Nine years later,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, acting on its understanding of Roth to mean that a
patently offensive book that appeals to prurient interest need not be unqualifiedly worthless

11

Roth., 354 U.S. at 490 (citing People v. Alberts, 292 P. 2d 90 (Cal. App. Super. 1955)).
Id. at 511-12, 514. Placing his faith in people’s inherent ability to reject meritless material, he concludes: “I
would give the broad sweep of the First Amendment full support. I have the same confidence in the ability of our
people to reject noxious literature as I have in their capacity to sort out the true from the false in theology,
economics, politics, or any other field.” Id. at 514.

12
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before it can be deemed obscene, found that John Cleland’s 1750 novel, Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure (commonly known as Fanny Hill), was obscene. 13
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Brennan found that the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court had misinterpreted the social value criterion of the Roth standard.
Justice Brennan reiterated that the relevant standard was whether the book was “found to be
utterly without redeeming social value.” 14 Since the courts below had found that the book
possessed a modicum of social value, reversal was required. 15
Faced with the near-impossible task of proving a negative, that a work had to be “utterly
without redeeming social value”, state court decisions were, in the years following the Memoirs
decision, routinely appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which found itself in the unenviable role
of serving as the final board of censorship for the 50 states. One has to feel a bit sorry for the
Justices of the Supreme Court, having to review countless alleged obscene works, looking for the
scrap of social value that might allow them to pass muster as protected works.
Frustrated by this unworkable standard, the Supreme Court tried again to define
obscenity in a way that would provide state courts with a viable standard. This new standard was
set forth by Chief Justice Warren Burger in the 1973 decision of Miller v. California 16 , and
consisted of a three-part test that, despite much criticism, remains the standard today.
The Miller test imposed the following basic guidelines for the trier of fact:
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. 17
Acknowledging the difficulties that courts have faced in attempting to articulate a
workable definition of obscenity, 18 Justice Burger asserted that requiring the application of local
community standards, defined in the opinion as the standards of a given state, 19 would “provide

13

A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” et. al. v. Attorney General of Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
14
A Book Named , 383 U.S. at 418.
15
Id. at 420. Justice Brennan then proceeded to muddy the waters by noting that a book that did have some
redeeming social value could still be found to be obscene if the circumstances of its production, sale and publicity of
the book was such that it was commercially exploited purely for prurient appeal. Id. And so the fog gets thicker.
16
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). This was a five-four decision of the Court. Justices White, Blackmun,
Powell and Rehnquist joined the majority. Justice Douglas dissented, and Justice Brennan also wrote a dissenting
opinion, which was joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall. Id.
17
Id. at 24. Justice Burger explicitly rejected the Memoirs requirement that the work be “utterly without redeeming
social value.” Id.
18
Id. at 30.
19
In this case, Justice Burger notes that the applicable community standard was that of “the State of California.” Id.
at 31. One has to wonder whether the majority of the Justices actually believed that the community standards of such
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fair notice to a dealer in such materials that his public and commercial activities may bring
prosecution.” 20 Justice Burger emphasized that a national standard definition of obscenity was
not attainable, citing Justice Warren’s Dissent in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 21 “I believe that there is no
provable ‘national standard’…At all events, this Court has not been able to enunciate one, and it
would be unreasonable to expect local courts to divine one.” 22
In a stinging dissent, Justice Douglas attacked the qualifications of the Court to attempt to
formulate a definition of obscenity as unprotected speech. 23 With bluntness tied to considerable
eloquence, he wrote:
The Court has worked hard to define obscenity and concededly has failed.
….
We deal with highly emotional, not rational, questions. To many the Song of
Solomon is obscene. I do not think we, as judges, were ever given the constitutional
power to make definitions of obscenity. If it is to be defined, let the people debate and
decide by a constitutional amendment what they want to ban as obscene and what
standards they want the legislatures and the courts to apply. Perhaps the people will
decide that the path towards a mature, integrated society requires that all ideas competing
for acceptance must have no censor. Perhaps they will decide otherwise. Whatever the
choice, the courts will have some guidelines. Now we have none except our own
predilections. 24
Justice Douglas got his wish. With the birth and amazingly swift and widespread acceptance of
the Internet and World Wide Web as a medium of communication, the U.S. Congress entered the
debate over the definition of obscenity through a series of attempts to regulate explicit sexual
material. Those efforts, rather than clarifying the issues, only brought more fog and murkiness to
the debate, as illustrated in this next section.

II.

Digital Fog – Obscenity Legislation and the Internet

Over the past 125 years, as each new means for the delivery of entertainment media has
been developed, from motion pictures to television, from videocassettes to DVDs, enterprising
entrepreneurs have seized on the new delivery platforms as an opportunity to market adultoriented product to an apparently highly interested audience. 25 The U.S. Congress, concerned
about the negative impact this material has on the moral fabric of society, and particularly
concerned with shielding children from that negative impact, has enacted numerous laws

disparate environs as San Francisco and San Diego were considered by the Court as being susceptible to a single
agreed-upon standard.
20
Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.
21
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964).
22
Id. at 200.
23
Miller, 413 U.S. at 37-47.
24
Id. at 37, 46-47.
25
See infra p. 21 for a discussion of the extent of explicit sexual material found on the Web.
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prohibiting the trafficking in these materials where they can either be obtained by, or involve the
use of, children. 26
a.

The Early Efforts: The CDA and COPA

The ubiquitous nature of the Internet and the ease with which children could access the
numerous adult-oriented entertainment sites online, galvanized Congress into an effort to shield
children from this material. Initial efforts to enact protective measures, however, were frustrated
by successful challenges on First Amendment grounds. Examples of these efforts are the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) 27 and the Children’s Online Protection Act of
1998 (COPA). 28
The CDA was one of the first of these protective measures passed by Congress on
February 1, 1996, in the nascent era of the Internet and the Web. Section 502(d) of the CDA
provided, in pertinent part, the following:
(d) Whoever-(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or
persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner
available to a person under 18 years of age,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or
excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such
service placed the call or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's
control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it
be used for such activity, shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
(e) In addition to any other defenses available by law: 29
The language of the statute, which describes the content circumscribed by the Act,
appears borrowed from the Supreme Court’s Miller test, in its reference to “patently offensive”
content, “as measured by contemporary community standards.” 30 Significantly absent, however,
is the leavening force of the third prong of the Miller test, the question of whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 31 It would appear

26

See, e.g., Karl A. Menninger, Cyberporn: Transmission of Images By Computer As Obscene, Harmful to Minors
or Child Pornography, 61 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 51 (2005).
27
47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996).
28
47 U.S.C. § 231(1998).
29
47 U.S.C. § 502 (1996), available at http://www.epic.org/free_speech/CDA/cda.html.
30
See, e.g., the discussion of Miller, supra at 4-6, notes 16-24.
31
Id.
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that when it came to protecting children, Congress felt that sexual or excretory, or organ matters,
however artistic or seriously dealt with, still should be banned. 32
No sooner had Congress passed the CDA were there strong calls for its repeal. Eight
days after its passage, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a bill to repeal Section 502. 33 In his
Floor Statement on repealing the CDA, Senator Leahy characterized it as “fatally flawed and
unconstitutional.” 34
Noting the broad sweep of the Act, and the absence of the important leavening aspect of
the third prong of the Miller test, Senator Leahy sounded a prescient warning about the danger of
trying to regulate content on the Internet:
Internet users will have to limit all language used and topics discussed in online
discussions accessible to minors to that appropriate for kindergartners, just in case
a child clicks onto the discussion. No literary quotes from racy parts of Catcher in
the Rye or Ulysses will be allowed. Certainly, online discussions of safe sex
practices, or birth control methods, and of AIDS prevention methods will be
suspect. Any user who crosses the vague and undefined line of "indecency" will
be subject to two years in jail and fines.
….
A few weeks ago, America Online took the online profile of a Vermonter
off the service. Why? Because the Vermonter used what AOL deemed a vulgar,
forbidden word. The word -- and I do not want to shock my colleagues -- but the
word was "breast." And the reason this Vermonter was using the word "breast"?
She was a survivor of breast cancer. She used the service to exchange the latest
information on detection of breast cancer or engage in support to those who are
survivors of breast cancer. Of course, eventually, America Online apologized and
indicated they would allow the use of the word where appropriate.
….
What strikes some people as "indecent" or "patently offensive" may look
very different to other people in another part of the country. Given these
differences, a vague ban on patently offensive and indecent communications may
make us feel good but threatens to drive off the Internet and computer networks
an unimaginable amount of valuable political, artistic, scientific, health and other
speech. 35

32

The author confesses some puzzlement as to whether there exists a body of content which contains patently
offensive descriptions of excretory functions or of bodily organs separate from any sexual context, a concern
Congress seems to have felt needed addressing since the language of the Act separates this content from sexual
content with an “or”. This preclusion also leaves open to question what a jury would use as a reference point to
determine what the contemporary community standard for non-patently offensive descriptions of excretory functions
would be.
33
S. 1567, 104th Cong. § 1 (1996), available at http://www.epic.org/free_speech/CDA/repeal.html.
34
Communications Decency Act of 1995: Hearing on S.1567 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.,
104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Patrick Leahy, Senator), available at
http://www.epic.org/free_speech/CDA/s1657_statement.html.
35
Id.
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Congress chose not to heed Sen. Leahy’s call for repeal and his bill was not passed.
However, within weeks of the passage of the CDA, an action by the American Civil Liberties
Union was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, challenging
the constitutionality of the CDA on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. 36 The ACLU action
was followed by a similar filing from the American Library Association, and the two actions
were joined and proceeded thereafter as a single case. 37
The District Court, in a unanimous decision supported by three separate statements by the
Judges of the Court, struck down the CDA. 38 The opinions of the judges all focused on the fact
that unlike the Miller case, the CDA focused on the term “indecency”, as the Court had defined
that term in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 39 and Sable Communications v. FCC. 40 The three
judges who made up the District Court panel reviewing the case each wrote separate opinions.
However, their conclusion that the Act was unconstitutional was unanimous. 41
District Judge Buckwalter found that the word “indecent” in § 223(a)(1)(B) and the
phrases “patently offensive” and “in context” in §223(d)(1) were so vague that enforcement of
criminal charges based on these sections would violate the “fundamental constitutional
principle” of “simple fairness.” 42 Similarly, Chief Judge Sloviter found that the statute “sweeps
more broadly than necessary and thereby chills the expression of adults” and that the terms
“patently offensive” and “indecent” were “inherently vague.” 43
The U.S. government appealed the District Court decision, under Section 561 of the
CDA’s special review provisions, which allowed the government to bypass appellate level
review and appeal directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. 44 The Court, noting probable jurisdiction,
accepted the case. 45 Oral argument was presented on March 19, 1997, and the Court issued its
decision on June 26, 1997, in which it affirmed the District Court. 46
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted that the decision of the Court was based
solely on First Amendment overbreadth grounds, and that although the statute’s vagueness was
relevant to the First Amendment analysis, the Fifth Amendment vagueness claim was not
separately addressed by the Court. 47

36

ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.Pa. 1996).
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 824.
38
Id.
39
438 U.S. 726 (1976).
40
492 U.S. 115 (1989).
41
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 824.
42
Id. at 861.
43
Id. at 854, 856.
44
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
45
Id.
46
Id. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. He was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice O’Connor filed an opinion in which she concurred in part, and dissented in
part. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice O’Connor’s opinion. Although not a unanimous opinion, this much
agreement on the part of the Court in a decision relating to obscenity law is a rarity.
47
Id. at 864-68.
37
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Justice Stevens rejected the government’s argument that the CDA was “plainly
constitutional” under three prior seminal obscenity decisions, Ginsberg v. New York; 48 FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation; 49 and Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 50 He also strongly rejected the
government’s assertion that the CDA is “no more vague than the [Court’s own] obscenity
standard…established in Miller v. California….” 51
The CDA does not provide the same protections afforded in the Miller standard, Justice
Stevens wrote, because it failed to include two key prongs of that test: “(1) that, taken as a
whole, the material appeal to the ‘prurient’ interest, and (2) that it ‘lack serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.’” 52 Stevens noted that this second prong is important because it is
not judged by contemporary community standards, thereby allowing appellate courts to “impose
some limitations and regularity on the definition by setting, as a matter of law, a national floor
for socially redeeming value.” 53
This analysis led Justice Stevens to conclude that the CDA presented a threat to free
speech:
We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment
requires when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors
access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large
amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address
to one another.
….
It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in
protecting children from harmful materials. But that interest does not justify an
48

390 U.S. 629 (1968).
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
50
475 U.S. 41 (1986); ACLU, 521 U.S. at 844. Justice Stevens distinguished the CDA from the rationales that
allowed the Court to uphold convictions in each of these three cases. Id. at 864-68. He noted that the statute at issue
in Ginsberg contained a more narrow prohibition against sales of explicit material, by including the requirement that
the material at issue be “utterly without redeeming social value,” and that the CDA added an additional year (from
17 to 18 years of age) to those prohibited from receiving the material at issue. Id. at 865-66. He noted further that the
CDA fails to define “indecent’ and “importantly, omits any requirement that the patently offensive material covered
by §223(d) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id. at 865. Moving on to the FCC v. Pacifica
case, the Court distinguishes it by noting that the Pacifica case limited the times when indecent material could be
broadcast over the radio; a medium that could only be afforded “limited First Amendment protection . . . because
warnings could not . . . protect listeners from unexpected program content.” Id. at 867. The Court noted the District
Court findings that the Internet had “no comparable history,” and that persons seeking to access material online had
to take “a series of affirmative steps” to reach it, as opposed to merely turning a dial. Id. Finally, the Court
distinguished the Renton case, noting the purpose of the zoning ordinance was to prevent the so-called “’secondary
effects’…of crime and deteriorating property values” that allegedly would plague neighborhoods where adult
theaters and similar businesses were allowed to operate. Id. Acknowledging that cyberspace might be a sort of
neighborhood, the Court nonetheless found that the CDA, with its prohibition against “indecent” speech, was a
“content-based blanket restriction on speech,” instead of a “time, place and manner” form of regulation. Id. at 86768.
51
ACLU, 521 U.S. at 872.
52
Id.at 873.
53
Id. It is significant to note that Justice Stevens did not follow this characterization of the value of this prong of the
Miller test with any citations to cases that subsequently established this “national floor for socially redeeming
value”. There is little evidence to suggest that this optimistic goal was ever achieved.
49
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unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults. As we have
explained, the government may not “reduce the adult population … to … only
what is fit for children.” 54
In her concurrence and dissent, Justice O’Connor argued that the majority opinion went
too far in its determination that the CDA is facially overbroad and vague. 55 She agreed that to the
extent the CDA was, in her view, “little more than an attempt by Congress to create ‘adult zones’
on the Internet,” that it failed because there was inadequate screening technology in 1997 to
screen out only minors from viewing content.56 Justice O’Connor also argued that there was no
showing by the plaintiff that the CDA burdened a substantial amount of material with some
redeeming value for minors, and that the CDA’s ban on the communication of obscene material
from an adult to a minor, where the minor’s status is known to the adult, should have been
upheld by the Court. 57
The relatively quick challenge and subsequent invalidation of the CDA’s effort to restrict
allegedly harmful online content sent Congress back to the drawing board for another attempt to
craft legislation that would pass constitutional scrutiny. The result of this second effort was the
enactment of the Children’s Online Protection Act (COPA). 58
Mindful of the concerns with unconstitutional overbreadth that plagued the CDA’s
attempt to address online content, the Congress fashioned COPA in a manner intended to comply
with the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in the Reno v. ACLU decision. The House
Report that accompanied the legislation outlined the purpose of COPA and the effect the prior
ruling had on its creation:
The purpose of H.R. 3783 is to amend the Communications Act of 1934 by
prohibiting the sale of pornographic materials on the World Wide Web (or the
Web) to minors. H.R. 3783 has been carefully drafted to respond to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) and the Committee
believes that the bill strikes the appropriate balance between preserving the First
Amendment rights of adults and protecting children from harmful material on the
World Wide Web.
H.R. 3783 prohibits a person from knowingly making, by means of the
World Wide Web, any communication for commercial purposes that is harmful to
minors, unless such person makes a good faith effort to restrict access by
minors. 59
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The ACLU viewed the terms of COPA with the same skepticism it had for the CDA
provisions and, in early 1999, launched a similar immediate constitutional challenge. The case
was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and
included, as plaintiffs, an array of different organizations representing booksellers and other
media organizations. 60 The ACLU and the other plaintiffs sought an injunction barring
enforcement of COPA on the grounds that it abridged the free speech rights of adults. 61 The
District Court agreed and issued the injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail at
trial in establishing that COPA was content-based regulation on sexual expression that was
presumptively invalid, subject to strict scrutiny, and was not the least restrictive means of
preventing access by minors. 62
Attorney General Reno appealed the District Court’s ruling. 63 To the government’s
dismay, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision, based on an entirely
different line of reasoning. 64 The Court of Appeals found that COPA’s use of the Miller case’s
“contemporary community standards” test to identify material harmful to minors rendered the
Act substantially overbroad because it was impossible, from a technology standpoint, for Web
publishers to limit access to their sites based on the geographic location of particular Internet
users. 65 This analysis highlights a conflict between the nature of the Internet, and the keystone of
the Miller decision – how can you determine the contemporary community standards of Web
users, who come from all over the country and the world? The Miller standard’s reliance on the
geographic boundaries of a local community has no meaning in the boundlessness of cyberspace.
The Supreme Court disagreed. In May 2002, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals’
decision and remanded the case to the District Court. 66 The decision by the Supreme Court
reflects seriously conflicting viewpoints by the justices over the meaning and applicability of the
amorphous Miller case phrase “contemporary community standards.” 67 The only point a
card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number.” The Report notes that the Act
“requires providers of interactive services to notify customers that parental control protections, such as computer
hardware, software, and filtering services, are commercially available that may assist the customer in limiting access
to material that is harmful to minors….” The Act also “establishes a Commission on Online Child Protection that is
required to study technological and other methods to help reduce access by minors to material that is harmful to
minors on the Internet.” Id. at 6.
60
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61
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majority of the Court was able to agree on was that COPA’s use of this standard to determine if
material is harmful to minors does not, on its face, violate the First Amendment.68 Since the
Court’s discussion on this issue will reappear in a slightly different context in the CIPA case that
is the focus of this article, it warrants careful examination.
Justice Thomas began the analysis by acknowledging the Court of Appeals’ concern that
the community standards test may not apply to the Internet because Web publishers have no
technological ability to limit the geographic territories in which their content may be viewed. He
carefully parsed the language of the Miller case, noting that the Court’s standard allowed
communities to define “community” by use of a precise geographic area, such as the State of
California, or a less precise phrasing, such as “contemporary community standards.” 69 In the
latter case, he acknowledged that the standard the jurors would apply “will inevitably draw upon
personal ‘knowledge of the community or vicinage from which he comes.’” 70 The government
acknowledged in their brief that even if jurors in a COPA case were instructed to apply the
standard of the adult population as a whole, “the variance in community standards across the
country could still cause juries in different locations to reach inconsistent conclusions as to
whether a particular work is ‘harmful to minors.’” 71
Acknowledging that this kind of inconsistency is troubling, Justice Thomas noted that
COPA attempts to make up for the potential uncertainty by adding the “serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value for minors” standard and that the material, to be subject to the Act,
must be designed to appeal to the prurient interest of minors. 72 He noted that the Court had held
that where these added standards are present, “we have held that requiring a speaker
disseminating material to a national audience to observe varying community standards does not
violate the First Amendment.” 73
Justice Thomas noted that Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens questioned the
applicability of those “community standards” prior decisions to the Internet, but disregarded this
concern by suggesting that if this poses a problem for a publisher, the solution is to abandon the
Internet and choose a medium with geographic controls:
The publisher’s burden does not change simply because it decides to distribute its
material to every community in the Nation.... If a publisher wishes for its material to be
judged only by the standards of particular communities, then it need only take the simple
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step of utilizing a medium that enables it to target the release of its material into those
communities. 74
Based on this analysis, Justice Thomas summed up the Court’s decision by noting that
the decision only addressed the error of the Court of Appeals’ finding that COPA’s reliance on
community standards does not by itself render the statute unconstitutional. The Court expressed
no opinion on the merit of the District Court’s finding that the Act suffered from constitutional
overbreadth and would not survive strict scrutiny. The Court remanded the case to the District
Court for further proceedings. 75
In her partially concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor urged the Court to set aside the
concerns previously voiced in Roth, Jacobellis, and Miller, regarding the impossibility of
adopting a national standard, and suggested that such a standard should now be adopted for the
regulation of obscenity on the Internet. 76 It appears that she came to this conclusion because she
recognized that since Web publishers can’t control the geographic locations in which their
content can be viewed, they are likely to engage in suppression of otherwise allowable speech.
Her solution, though, to adopt a national standard, did not offer any real assistance since the
same or an even greater degree of variance, despite her claim to the contrary, is likely to be the
result. Her efforts to convince her colleagues of this view rang hollow, and it feels as if she is
also trying to convince herself as well:
If the Miller Court believed generalizations about the standards of the people of
California were possible, and that jurors would be capable of assessing them, it is
difficult to believe that similar generalizations are not also possible for the Nation
as a whole. Moreover, the existence of the Internet, and its facilitation of national
dialogue, has itself made jurors more aware of the views of adults in other parts of
the United States. Although jurors asked to evaluate the obscenity of speech
based on a national standard will inevitably base their assessments to some extent
on their experience of their local communities, I agree with Justice B[reyer] that
the lesser degree of variation that would result is inherent in the jury system and
does not necessarily pose a First Amendment problem. 77
The unanswered question that follows from Justice O’Connor’s analysis is that if jurors
are going to apply their experience in their local communities, then how is the standard, as
applied, a “national” one? The further question of what criteria are applied to determine what
the “national standard” is in a given case is also not answered. A third question that arises is that
if a publisher distributes material in hard copy as well as online, will the same material be subject
to two different standards, a local community standard for the hard copy, and a national standard
for the online material? This issue is not addressed.
74
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Issues not addressed by either the District Court or the Court of Appeals are the
motivating force behind the separate concurrence of Justice Kennedy, whose viewpoint was
shared by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy began by noting that the District
Court may have been right in determining that COPA is overbroad, and as a content-based
regulation it was presumptively invalid and an abridgement of free speech. 78
Justice Kennedy disagreed with Justice Thomas’ suggestion that publishers should simply
find another medium, noting that “laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression” pose a
danger to free speech. Zeroing in on the “community standards” debate, he rejected Justice
O’Connor’s national standard proposal, noting: “The national variation in community standards
constitutes a particular burden on Internet speech”. 79 He also sounded a note of concern that the
use of a national standard would allow forum shopping in Internet cases, since there is some
uncertainty whether a Web site moves “through” a number of different communities. 80 As he
pointed out, this could give the government the opportunity to choose the forum for bringing an
action, and for that reason, the Court of Appeals was right to consider the community standards
issue:
The more venues the [g]overnment has to choose from, the more speech will be chilled
by variation across communities….The Court of Appeals was correct to focus on the
national variation in community standards, which can constitute a substantial burden on
Internet communication; and its ultimate conclusion may prove correct. 81
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, was more direct. Citing the result in the first ACLU v.
Reno case regarding the CDA, he reminded the Court that it previously held that community
standards, as applied to the Internet, created an overbreadth problem. 82 In a pointed footnote, he
also reminded the Court that although it had not held that applying a national standard to
obscenity cases was constitutionally impermissible, “we have said that asking a jury to do so is
‘an exercise in futility.’” 83
On remand to the Court of Appeals, focusing this time on the same overbreadth of the
Act that motivated the District Court to issue injunctive relief, the Court reaffirmed its prior
determination that COPA violated the First Amendment. 84 The Court of Appeals considered
whether other less restrictive means of shielding minors from harmful material existed. 85 One
alternative method it considered was the use of blocking and filtering software programs. 86 The
Court noted that the District Court had also considered this option, and had concluded that
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although filtering and blocking software was imperfect, it would be at least as successful as
COPA in restricting minors’ access to harmful material. It would also impose less of a burden on
constitutionally protected speech than the Act imposed on adult users. 87
In response, the government argued that filtering software was not a viable means of
preventing access by children to harmful material, and that COPA was a much more effective
tool. The Court describes the three problems the government ascribed to filtering software:
The [g]overnment offers the following three reasons for this conclusion: (1) filtering
software is voluntary – it transfers the burden of protecting children from the source of
the harmful material, i.e. the Web publishers, to the potential victims and their parents;
(2) filtering software is often both over- and underinclusive of targeted material; and (3)
it is more effective to screen material “prior to it being sent or posted to minors” on the
Internet. 88
The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that these arguments had some merit,
concurred with the District Court’s view that blocking and filtering techniques, despite their
weaknesses, were at least less restrictive than COPA in achieving the Act’s goal of preventing
minors’ access to harmful material. 89 On the way to reaching this conclusion, the Court had to
reconcile this view of filtering software with the decision of a three-judge Pennsylvania District
Court in American Library Ass’n. v. U.S.. 90 In that decision, which is discussed in detail in
Section III of this Article, the panel struck down the Children’s Internet Protection Act’s (CIPA)
requirement that all public libraries receiving government funding for computers and Internet
access must install filtering and blocking software on all computers in the library. The threejudge panel found that this requirement violated the First Amendment rights of library patrons. 91
The Court of Appeals in ACLU v. Ashcroft distinguished the decision in American
Library Ass’n v. U.S. by noting that unlike CIPA, it was not proposing the mandatory use of the
software, and that voluntary use was therefore not as burdensome on free speech, particularly
when compared with COPA’s broadly sweeping provisions. 92 The Court also noted that CIPA’s
method for allowing adults to gain access to blocked sites, the “disabling provision”, which
required adults to identify themselves to librarians in order to disable a filter and therefore gain
unlimited access to online material, created a “chilling effect” on their free speech, and that the
remedy they were proposing as an alternative to COPA, did not contain this provision. 93
And so, this second Congressional effort to prevent minors from accessing Internet-based
material harmful to them was rejected by the judiciary. 94 Congress, however, is not so easily
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deterred, and before the final ruling in the ACLU v. Ashcroft was issued, Congress had once
again passed legislation aimed at limiting minors’ access. 95 This time, Congress reined in their
sights, and focused on an area that their budget power reached – access to the Internet on
government-funded computers in public libraries.
b.

The Third Strike: Congress Adopts CIPA

This new statute was known as the Children’s Internet Protection Act, or CIPA. 96 The
August 1999 Senate Report detailing the terms of the bill creating CIPA explained that the
purpose of the bill was “[t]o protect America’s children from exposure to obscene material, child
pornography, or other material deemed inappropriate for minors while accessing the Internet
from a school or library receiving Federal Universal Service assistance for provisions of Internet
access, Internet service, or internal connection.” 97
The “Federal Universal Service” referred to in the bill is a subsidy that was added by
Section 254 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. It is commonly referred to as the Schools
and Libraries Discount, or E-rate, and is a 2.25 billion dollar subsidy to assist schools and
libraries with the costs associated with connecting those institutions to the Internet. 98 In
addition to the E-rate program, libraries also receive subsidies for Internet access via the Library
Services and Technology Act (“LSTA”). 99
Concerned that federal dollars may be providing a means for children to access the many
dangerous websites on the Internet, which the Senate Report described as including child
pornography, pedophilia sites, and sites which promote hate, illicit drug use and bomb-making
information, CIPA was intended to prevent access to this kind of material in public schools and
libraries, by requiring that all computers in those institutions, as a condition of obtaining E-rate
and LSTA subsidies, must install filtering and blocking software packages. 100
As valid as the concern of sheltering minors from this material may be, there are
troubling economic and social manipulation issues posed by this legislation. Recent surveys
reflect that more than 60% of the households in American contain Internet connections. Many
schools and universities now require students to have Internet access to take advantage of webenhanced courses or to conduct research. For the vast majority of the middle and upper class of
95
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the United States, computer and Internet savvy is a given aspect of their lives, and it is rapidly
becoming a necessary tool in business and society in general.
However, the Information Superhighway often is just an off-ramp to a dead end for the
less fortunate citizens in the United States. For those children of families of modest means, the
cost of a personal computer and Internet access is beyond those means. For those children,
access to a computer and the Internet may only be found in their schools or public libraries. Yet
the effect of legislation like CIPA restricts what those students will see to only those sites
deemed by the producers of the filtering and blocking technology as “appropriate” for them. The
Act does not attempt, nor does any other legislation, to shield children who have private
computers from accessing these allegedly harmful sites. In essence then, a side effect of CIPA is
to create a two-tier system of access to Web sites for citizens in the United States – filtered and
blocked Internet access for the poor, and full access for the rich. 101
Anticipating the First Amendment arguments that would follow the imposition of
mandatory filtering in America’s public libraries and schools, the Senate Report noted the
compelling government interest in protecting children from harmful influences, and set the stage
for a significant argument in the ensuing litigation: whether public schools or libraries are public
forums, since if they are, any content-based restriction affecting them would be subject to strict
scrutiny First Amendment analysis; and if they are not, intermediate scrutiny will be the relevant
standard. 102
The Senate Report also focused on the right of Congress, in a spending bill, to require, as
a condition for receipt of a Federal subsidy, measures to restrict children’s access to harmful
material. The Report cited Supreme Court decisions in Rust v. Sullivan 103 and National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley 104 as precedent to support conditioning receipt of Federal
assistance on compliance with the filtering and blocking software requirement. Congress
indicated its belief that it had successfully addressed the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
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concerns by noting: “In sum, the Committee is confident that the approach of S. 97 to schools
would survive any constitutional challenge brought in Federal court”. 105
The net effect of CIPA was to require all public schools and libraries receiving E-rate
subsidies, to install and operate filtering or blocking technology on computers when in use by
children. The Act does not allow libraries to designate specific computers for use by children.
Instead it requires that all computers be filtered and blocked. 106 What about adult users? CIPA
provides that “[a]n administrator, supervisor, or other authority may disable a technology
protection measure under paragraph (1) to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful
purposes.” 107
This “disabling” provision is troubling in the extreme – it poses far more problems than it
purports to solve. The provision is silent as to what standard the “administrator, supervisor or
other authority” is to use in determining whether a patron’s request to disable the filter is for
“bona fide research or other lawful purpose”, an omission which gives the person with control
over the computer discretion to determine the rights of adult patrons to access online content. 108
Additional privacy issues are posed by this provision – in a large city, the relative anonymity of
library patrons provides some shield on this issue – but the small town library does not. Instead,
we are left with the image of a well known citizen of the small town having to ask the librarian to
disable the filter in order to allow the patron to access sites dealing with breast cancer, or penile
dysfunction, both sites likely to trigger sensitive filtering software.
CIPA’s disabling provision is also silent regarding technological and logistical challenges
posed by its terms. It requires librarians to train personnel on how to disable the filters, and
poses such questions as whether the disabling is limited to a specific site, or will result in
disabling the entire filter. If the former, it will be unpopular and burdensome on both patrons
and staff if research in a filtered area requires multiple requests for disabling the filter. If the
latter, disabling the filter in general for a patron invites the same problems of access of
inappropriate material that CIPA is intended to prevent. Moreover, once the filter is disabled, the
patron and staff must remember which computers have disabled filters, and to renew the filter
before the next patron uses the computer. For a major metropolitan library, which may have a
substantial number of computers available for the public, this provision poses a logistical
nightmare.
CIPA also came equipped with enforcement provisions. Libraries that fail to certify the
presence of filtering and blocking software on all of their computers are required to reimburse
the telecommunications carrier that provided their Internet access with the amount of the
discounted rates they received under the E-rate system. 109
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Like the previous attempts at limiting online access to prevent children from receiving
harmful material, CIPA garnered an immediate legal challenge. The first stage of that challenge
was in the District Court, and is the focus of the next section.

III.

The District Court Decision: A Sunny Day

The challenge to CIPA was filed by an assortment of plaintiffs, including the American
Library Association as lead plaintiff. 110 Following an expedited but extensive discovery
schedule, the District Court conducted an eight-day trial, in which the parties presented
testimony from 20 witnesses, and provided the court with numerous deposition transcripts,
stipulations and documents. The principal focus of the trial was on the viability and capacity of
the filtering and blocking software programs available at the time – which goes to the heart of
the CIPA requirements. 111
The Court produced an extraordinary opinion at the conclusion of the trial, comprising 71
pages, of which it devoted 30 pages to summarizing the extensive findings of fact derived from
the expert testimony and related documents presented on the filtering technology issue. 112 The
balance of the opinion dealt with the appropriate level of scrutiny CIPA was subject to, either
strict scrutiny or the “rational basis” standard; and the related issue of whether public libraries
are public forums in a traditional or new sense; and whether the filtering and blocking software
required by CIPA was narrowly tailored to meet the government’s objectives, or whether less
restrictive alternatives existed, mandating a determination that the statute was overbroad. 113
The Opinion began with the Court’s Preliminary Statement, in which it summarized the
grounds advanced by the plaintiffs in support of a desired finding that CIPA is facially
unconstitutional. Plaintiffs alleged that CIPA required libraries to give up their patrons’ First
Amendment rights as a condition of receiving federal funds, an impermissible requirement under
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 114 The gravamen of this argument was that, given the
limits of filtering and blocking software, CIPA’s insistence on this technology being installed on
all library computers resulted in content-based restrictions of patrons’ access to what is otherwise
constitutionally protected speech. The Court noted that plaintiffs contended that content-based
restrictions such as are found in CIPA are subject to review under a strict scrutiny standard
because libraries are public forums, and such restrictions are only allowable if they are narrowly
110
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tailored to further a compelling state interest and no less restrictive alternatives would further
that interest. 115 Plaintiffs’ further grounds included the argument that CIPA
imposes an unconstitutional condition on public libraries by requiring them to relinquish
their own First Amendment rights to provide unfiltered Internet access as a condition of
their receipt of federal funds…that CIPA is facially invalid because it effects an
impermissible prior restrain on speech by granting filtering companies and library staff
unfettered discretion to suppress speech before it has been received by library patrons and
before it has been subject to a judicial determination that it is unprotected under the First
Amendment. Finally, plaintiffs submit that CIPA is unconstitutionally vague. 116
After summarizing the statutory framework of CIPA and the nature of the various
plaintiffs in the case, 117 the Court provided a detailed summary of the workings of the Internet,
the size and scope of websites found online, and the amount of sexually explicit material on the
Web. 118 Although the Court noted that recent estimates put the number of sexually explicit
online content at only 1-2% of the total content on the Web, given the size of the Web this
translates to more than 100,000 sites offering free sexually explicit material, and many more fee
or subscriber based sites with this type of content. 119
The Court’s next focus was on the delivery of Internet access by U.S. public libraries to
citizens. The Court found that approximately 95 of all public libraries provided public access to
the Internet. 120 This access is hugely popular, and greatly expands the amount of information
available to library patrons. In many ways, it provides a tremendous benefit, particularly to
public libraries in smaller cities or economically depressed areas, since it allows a library to
provide a vast amount of material without significantly increasing the acquisition budget of the
library. The Court noted that over a fifth of the Internet users with low (under $15,000)
household family incomes use their public library for Internet access. 121
The Court’s findings also provided a detailed analysis of the diverse range of approaches
libraries have taken in creating “acceptable use” policies governing patrons’ use of the
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Internet. 122 Some libraries limit such policies to sexually explicit materials, whereas others apply
their policy to a broader range of materials, including those found “harmful to minors,”
“offensive to the public,” “racially offensive,” or those found to simply be “inappropriate.” 123
Enforcement of these policies has led libraries to develop a variety of approaches,
broadly organized into four categories: (1) channeling patrons’ Internet use; (2) shielding other
patrons from seeing what a Web surfer is viewing; (3) locating computer screens in a manner to
allow librarians to see what a surfer is viewing, allowing the librarian to employ “tap on the
shoulder” enforcement as to inappropriate material; (4) employing filtering or blocking
software. 124
The development of this range of alternative approaches supports the view that regulating
online content viewing in public libraries is a problem perhaps best addressed through a “local
community standard,” since each library is uniquely equipped to understand the needs and
sensitivities of the community they serve. Given the diverse nature of communities nationwide,
great caution should be observed before attempting to adopt a national approach to this issue – a
caution acknowledged by the District Court in this case. 125
The Court noted that a significant issue presented by blocked or filtered Internet access
was the privacy and embarrassment factors that are presented when patrons must ask a librarian
to unblock a site or page. These findings are summarized as follows:
It is apparent that many patrons are reluctant or unwilling to ask librarians to unblock
Web pages or sites that contain only materials that might be deemed personal or
embarrassing, even if they are not sexually explicit or pornographic. We credit the
testimony of Emmalyn Rood, discussed above, that she would have been unwilling as a
young teen to ask a librarian to disable filtering software so that she could view materials
concerning gay and lesbian issues. 126
The Court next reviewed the state of Internet filtering technology. The opinion devoted
twenty-three pages to an exhaustive analysis of the viability and problems with the application of
this technology to use in public libraries providing Internet access. 127
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The analysis began by explaining that the major purveyors of this software create control
lists of hundreds of thousands of Universal Resource Locator (URL) sites, divided into numerous
text-based categories, which then are submitted to the filtering and blocking program, and sites
whose URL’s have been identified as containing the text listed within these categories, are
blocked from a patron’s view. The evidence submitted to the Court focused on the three major
products on the market which were currently in use in public libraries - SurfControl’s Cyber
Patrol, N2H2’s Bess/12100, and Secure Computing’s SmartFilter – each of which have control
lists containing between 200,000 and 600,000 URLs. 128
Of considerable significance are the technological limitations of these products. The
court noted that none of the category definitions used in these products were identical to CIPA’s
definitions of visual depictions that are obscene, child pornography, or harmful to minors. 129
Further, none of these category definitions made any attempt to incorporate local community
standards, a very troubling omission given the significance the Supreme Court had attached to
this standard in the determination of legal obscenity. 130
A second significant technological weakness in these products is their inability to identify
and block or filter sites based on visual images. These products only search and identify
offending URLs based on text. So, if a Web site contains graphic visual depictions of a sexually
explicit nature, but no text is included on the pages, it will sail right past the filter unless the site
is also reviewed by a human employee of the software company. The Court noted that this was
not a problem likely to be solved in the near term: “Image recognition technology is immature,
ineffective, and unlikely to improve substantially in the near future.” 131
A third technological limitation is the practice of categorizing Web sites based on what is
know as the “root URL” of the entire site. The example cited by the Court was the practice of
blocking all of the content on the Playboy Web site because the Root URL was categorized as
Adult, Sexually Explicit, or Pornography, despite the fact that many pages on the site may
contain content that is not sexual in nature, such as the celebrity interviews, or articles relating to
historical or political events. 132
Two human factors also are found by the Court to add to the problems of using filtering
and software technology: the proprietary nature of the lists of blocked URLs, and the inability to
re-review blocked sites and pages due to the sheer number of new pages (1.5 million per day)
that are added to the Web. 133 The Court noted that since the manufacturers of these software
products considered the actual lists of URLs blocked under their categorization regimes to be
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proprietary in nature, it was more difficult to determine if those sites contained protected
speech. 134
The second factor, the lack of a re-reviewing practice, is even more troublesome. Many
Web sites are dynamic, meaning that the content on their pages is changed frequently. 135 If an
entire site or even discrete pages are blocked once, they stay blocked in that software program
unless specifically reviewed and the blocking is released. 136 Additionally, URLs are often
abandoned and reassigned to new owners, who may substitute content, with the result that a
blocked site that formerly contained objectionable content may no longer present that content. 137
However, it will remain blocked by one or more of the filtering software companies’ product
simply because no one knew it was blocked initially, and no re-review takes place. 138
Based on their exhaustive analysis, only a portion of which is summarized herein, the
Court concluded that under CIPA, not only is the dirty bathwater of pornographic material
thrown out by the filtering software, but the baby is too – in the form of significant amounts of
protected free speech:
Nonetheless, out of the entire universe of speech on the Internet falling within `the
filtering products’ category definitions, the filters will incorrectly fail to block a
substantial amount of speech. Thus, software filters have not completely eliminated the
problems that public libraries sought to address by using the filters, as evidenced by
frequent instances of underblocking.
….
Even more importantly…we find that commercially available filtering programs
erroneously block a huge amount of speech that is protected by the First Amendment.
Any currently available filtering that is reasonably effective in preventing users from
accessing content within the filter’s category definitions will necessarily block countless
thousands of Web pages, the content of which does not match the filtering company’s
category definitions, much less the legal definitions of obscenity, child pornography, or
harmful to minors.
….
…Many erroneously blocked pages contain content that is completely innocuous for both
adults and minors, and that no rational person could conclude matches the filtering
companies’ category definitions, such as “pornography” or “sex.”
….
No presently conceivable technology can make the judgments necessary to
determine whether a visual depiction fits the legal definitions of obscenity, child
pornography, or harmful to minors. Given the state of art in filtering and image
recognition technology, and the rapidly changing and expanding nature of the Web, we
find that filtering products’ shortcomings will not be solved through a technical solution
in the foreseeable future. 139
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The Court next turned to the merits of the plaintiffs claim that CIPA was facially invalid
and violated the First Amendment rights of the libraries and their patrons.140 The strength or
weakness of that claim depended in significant part on the outcome of the analysis of
constitutional limitations on Congress’ exercise of the spending power. 141 Based on the fourth
prong of the standard set forth in Dole, 142 plaintiffs argued that the “First Amendment ‘provides
an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds’ created by CIPA.” 143 In considering
this argument, the District Court noted that the general rule that a “court may sustain a facial
challenge to a statue only if the plaintiff demonstrates that the statue admits of no constitutional
application” 144 was subject to an exception in cases dealing with First Amendment
overbreadth. 145 In the case where a statute burdens a “substantial amount of protected” speech,
facial invalidation was permissible, “even if the statute may be constitutionally applied in
particular circumstances.” 146
The District Court also acknowledged that the parameters of this First Amendment
exception to the facial challenge standard presented somewhat of a moving target for lower
courts in view of disparate Supreme Court opinions in Rust v. Sullivan 147 and NEA v. Finley. 148
These cases first present a tougher standard, and then a more liberal standard for the application
of the exception. 149
Given the somewhat ambiguous jurisprudence regarding this exception, the District Court
adopted the more restrictive standard - for CIPA to fail, the libraries must show that compliance
with the statute would necessarily violate the First Amendment. 150 Despite the adoption of this
tougher standard, the District Court noted that compliance with CIPA does in fact violate the
First Amendment “[b]ecause of the inherent limitations in filtering technology, public libraries
can never comply with CIPA without blocking access to a substantial amount of speech that is
140
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both constitutionally protected and fails to meet even the filtering companies’ own blocking
criteria.” 151
This conclusion led the District Court to next consider the government’s argument that
the appropriate level of scrutiny of CIPA’s limitations on protected speech was rational basis
review, and the plaintiffs’ argument that as a content-based limitation, CIPA was subject to strict
scrutiny. The outcome of this argument determined whether the government would be required
to show that CIPA was narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest and that
no less restrictive alternatives would further that interest, or whether CIPA need only be
reasonable, that the government’s interest that the restriction serves need not be compelling, the
statute need not be narrowly tailored, and that it need not be the most reasonable or the only
reasonable limitation. 152
The answer to this question required the District Court to next consider where libraries fit
under public forum doctrine, since the government’s power to limit speech on its own property is
dependent on the nature of the forum the government has created. 153 If the restriction is applied
to an area less amenable to free expression, such as a military base or a jail, First Amendment
considerations are less stringently applied 154 Conversely, if the government property is a public
street, sidewalk or park, restrictions on protected speech are subject to strict scrutiny. 155
Applying these principals to the public libraries provision of Internet access to patrons,
the District Court noted further that the relevant forum is “not defined by the physical limits of
the government property at issue, but rather by the specific access that the plaintiff seeks” –
which in this case means that the Court is not to examine the entire library, but only the Internet
access provided by the library, in determining what kind of fora is involved. 156
The first stage of this inquiry required a discussion of what is the purpose of a public
library. In Perry, the Court held that the purpose of a public library is “for use by the
public…for expressive activity.” 157 The government response to this question was to note that
public libraries routinely make decisions limiting the content of their collection, and that such
decisions are not subject to strict scrutiny, nor should they be. 158 In support of this argument the
government cited the decisions in Rust and Finley, for the principle that the government may
make a decision to fund a particular viewpoint it seeks to advance, without necessitating a level
of scrutiny beyond rational basis. 159
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In Rust, for example, the Court upheld viewpoint-based funding, noting “[w]hen
Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to
adopt democratic principles, 22 U.S.C. §4411(b), it was not constitutionally required to fund a
program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and
fascism.” 160
This principal was strengthened in the Finley case, in which the Court upheld the right of
the National Endowment for the Arts to condition its grants on a judgment it reserved as to the
artistic merit of submissions. In support of its ruling, the Finley Court noted: “The very
assumption of the NEA is that grants will be awarded according to the artistic worth of
competing applications, and absolute neutrality is inconceivable.” 161
Based on these authorities, it would seem at first impression that the conditional grant of
funds must allow the government broad latitude to impose content-based restrictions. The
District Court in American Library Ass’n. v. U.S. disagreed, distinguishing Rust and Finley by
noting that:
The more broadly the government facilitates private speech, however, the less deference
the First Amendment accords to the government’s content-based restrictions on the
speech that it facilitates. Thus, where the government creates a designated public forum
to facilitate private speech representing a diverse range of viewpoints, the government’s
decision selectively to single out particular viewpoints for exclusion is subject to strict
scrutiny. 162
In sum, the District Court concluded: “Thus, we believe that where the state designates a
forum for expressive activity and opens the forum for speech by the public at large on a wide
range of topics, strict scrutiny applies to restrictions that single out for exclusion from the forum
particular speech whose content is disfavored.” 163
It is at this point that the District Court confronted a central tenet in the government’s
argument: if we agree that public libraries have the power to limit their collection of books, and
that challenges to those limitations must proceed on a rational basis level of scrutiny, Internet
access limitations in a public library must be judged by the same standard. The District Court
considered this argument, and rejected it, noting that in the traditional library screening process,
staff review and select the books based on a determination of the needs of the community,
whereas the Internet provides a vast amount of material, which no one person could ever review
and select from:
Nonetheless, we disagree with the government’s argument that public libraries’ use of
Internet filters is no different, for First Amendment purposes, from the editorial discretion
160
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that they exercise when they choose to acquire certain books on the basis of librarians’
evaluation of their quality. The central difference, in our view, is that by providing
patrons with even filtered Internet access, the library permits patrons to receive speech on
a virtually unlimited number of topics, from a virtually unlimited number of speakers,
without attempting to restrict patrons’ access to speech that the library, in the exercise of
its professional judgment, determines to be particularly valuable. 164
This analysis focused on the flaw in the argument that using filters to block or limit
Internet content accessible by patrons is no different than the selectivity librarians’ exercise in
choosing which books to purchase for the library collection. The difference is found in the
nature of the Internet – with over 2 billion pages available, and over 1.5 million added daily, it is
simply impossible for mechanical filters, or human reviewers working for filtering or blocking
software manufacturers, to review and delete material allegedly obscene or harmful to minors
without at the same time preventing access to vast amounts of protected speech. Neither the
technological nor the human means exist to effectively perform this selection function. Given the
significant role libraries play as a “mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas,” 165 the
District Court was reluctant to sanction the broad use of this technology mandated by CIPA. 166
While also acknowledging that the Internet is not a traditional example of public fora, the
Court found that the Internet does share many of the characteristics of streets, sidewalks and
parks as loci for free expression. 167 In fact, these traditional fora suffer from geographic
limitations not present in online expression and communication – you can only physically
address a limited number of people in the park or on the street – whereas an unlimited number
can be reached via cyberspace, through the use of chat rooms, message boards and free Web
hosting services. Moreover, Internet access in public libraries also serves the role of making the
digital highway a road accessible for all, eliminating the off-ramps and dead ends that poverty
mandates for those unable to afford private Internet access. 168 The District Court summarized its
finding that Internet access in public libraries, as public fora, require that any statute that
attempts to restrict that access be subject to strict scrutiny, as follows:
In short, public libraries, by providing their patrons with access to the Internet, have
created a public forum that provides any member of the public free access to information
from millions of speakers around the world. The unique speech-enhancing character of
Internet use in public libraries derives from the openness of the public library to any
member of the public seeking to receive information, and the openness of the Internet to
any member of the public who wishes to speak.
….
A faithful translation of First Amendment values from the context of traditional
fora such as sidewalks and parks to the distinctly non-traditional public forum of Internet
164
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access in public libraries requires, in our view, that content-based restrictions on Internet
access in public libraries be subject to the same exacting standards of First Amendment
scrutiny as content-based restrictions on speech in traditional public fora such as
sidewalks, town squares, and parks. 169
The District Court’s determination that strict scrutiny must be applied to CIPA’s
mandated restrictions on Internet access next required the Court to review the statute to see
whether (1) there was a compelling government interest that the use of filtering software
promotes; (2) the use of filtering software under CIPA was narrowly tailored to further that
interest; and (3) whether less restrictive alternatives existed that would promote the
government’s interest. 170
The Court found no difficulty in determining that the government’s stated interest in
preventing the dissemination of obscenity, child pornography and material harmful to minors
was a legitimate state interest, particularly given the possibility that library patrons, either those
using the libraries’ computers to surf the Internet, or those merely passing by the computers,
might also be unwillingly exposed to offensive material. The Court found that this legitimate
interest could be served by filtering software that prevented access to those materials. 171
The Court next considered whether CIPA’s requirement that all library computers be
equipped with filtering or blocking software was narrowly tailored to meet the legitimate state
interest. Here CIPA ran afoul of the limits of technology. The Court found:
The commercially available filters on which evidence was presented at trial all block
many thousands of Web pages that are clearly not harmful to minors, and many
thousands more pages that, while possible harmful to minors, are neither obscene nor
child pornography….Given the substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech
blocked by the filters studied we conclude that use of such filters is not narrowly tailored
with respect to the governments’ interest in preventing the dissemination of obscenity,
child pornography, and material harmful to others. 172
The Court found that CIPA resembled the Communications Decency Act, and noted that
the CDA had been found to be facially invalid due in part to limitations in the available
technology to determine the age of Internet surfers. These similarities were summarized as
follows:
169
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Similarly, although on its face, CIPA, like the CDA, requires the suppression of only
constitutionally unprotected speech, it is impossible as a practical matter, given the state
of the art of filtering technology, for a public library to comply with CIPA without also
blocking significant amounts of constitutionally protected speech. 173
Turning to the third prong in the strict scrutiny analysis, the existence of less restrictive
alternatives, the District Court found that the numerous other less restrictive methods public
libraries had employed before the enactment of CIPA, including privacy screens, the “tap on the
shoulder” method, and post-use review and warnings of suspension of access privileges, were all
at least as effective in meeting the government’s interest in limited minor’s access to harmful
material. 174 Based on this finding, the Court concluded that the “government had failed to show
that the less restrictive alternatives…are ineffective at furthering the government’s interest.” 175
In an effort to rebut the lack of narrow tailoring argument, the government argued that the
disabling provisions of CIPA cured the tailoring defect. The District Court rejected this
argument, noting that the statute’s disabling provision, which allowed library staff to disable the
filtering software for an adult patron, “to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful
purposes,” 176 was vague and would likely deter many patrons, particularly “those who have
sensitive positions.” 177 The District Court also noted that the disabling provision also present
timing problems since in some libraries, response times to requests for disabling the filters could
take days, which in turn imposed a serious burden on patron’s use of the Internet. 178
Having conducted this exhaustive review of the technological and legal barriers to CIPA,
the District Court concluded as follows:
In view of the severe limitations of filtering technology and the existence of these less
restrictive alternatives, we conclude that is it not possible for a public library to comply
with CIPA without blocking a very substantial amount of constitutionally protected
speech, in violation of the First Amendment. 179
The District Court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that CIPA was facially
invalid under the First Amendment and permanently enjoined its enforcement. 180 This carefully
drafted decision represents a bright burst of sunlight in the often-murky fog of obscenity law.
However, off the coast, fog was gathering. The government took an immediate appeal of the
decision, and the ultimate fate of CIPA was placed in the hands of the Supreme Court.
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IV.

The Fog Returns: The Supreme Court Decision

In an opinion marked by fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Internet, and
with little regard to past Supreme Court obscenity law jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
reversed the District Court decision. 181 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the four-judge
plurality, began the Opinion with several questionable assertions of fact, which become critical
to the merits of the legal principals subsequently based on those assumptions.
At the outset, Justice Rehnquist, quoting from various sources who provided data to the
Congressional hearings regarding the enactment of CIPA, opined that the accessibility for library
patrons of pornography on the Internet is a “serious” problem, noting that one source collected
over “2000 incidents of patrons, both adults and minors, using library computers to view online
pornography, including obscenity and child pornography.” 182 Since this is the principal evidence
cited by the plurality as indicative of the severity of the problem, and given that with over 9000
public libraries nationwide this works out to an average of .22 incidents per location, it is
uncertain if this level of activity warrants Congressional attention.
Justice Rehnquist next noted that conditional grant jurisprudence, as outlined in Dole, had
affirmed the wide latitude given to Congress to impose conditions on the grant of federal
subsidies, such as the E-rate and LSTA subsidies. 183 In the first of a series of defensive responses
to dissent opinions, Justice Rehnquist argued that Justice Stevens “[m]isapprehends the analysis
we must perform to determine whether CIPA exceeds Congress’ authority under the Spending
Clause.” 184 The dissent is criticized for focusing on whether Congress had the right to “impose
[CIPA’s filtering] requirement” on public libraries, instead of “allowing local decisionmakers
[sic] to tailor their responses to local problems.” 185 Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the
appropriate standard was whether the condition Congress required “would…be unconstitutional”
if performed by the library itself. 186
While this is a correct statement of the Dole standard, Justice Rehnquist missed the point
Justice Stevens was making in the cited reference. Justice Stevens was pointing out that in
adopting a standard applicable on a nationwide basis, requiring the use of filtering software that
has no component recognizing and applying local community standards to the definition of
“obscene” materials, Congress was ignoring the Court’s prior determination in Miller that local
communities were best equipped to determine what was, or was not, obscene in their regions. 187
Justice Stevens found a secondary source author who expressed this view in unequivocal terms:
Indeed, federal or state mandates in this area are unnecessary and unwise. Locally
designed solutions are likely to best meet local circumstances. Local decision makers
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and library boards, responding to local concerns and the prevalence of the problem in
their own libraries, should decide if minors’ Internet access requires filters. They are the
persons in the best position to judge local community standards for what is and is not
obscene, as required by the Miller [v. California] test. Indeed, one nationwide solution is
not needed, as the problems are local and, to some extent, uniquely so. Libraries in rural
communities, for instance, have reported much less of a problem than libraries in urban
areas. A library in a rural community with only one or two computers with Internet
access may find that even the limited filtering advocated here provides little or no
additional benefit. Further, by allowing the nation’s public libraries to develop their own
approaches, they may be able to develop a better understanding of what methods work
well and what methods add little or nothing, or are even counter-productive. Imposing a
mandatory nationwide solution may well impede developing truly effective approaches
that do not violate the First Amendment. The federal and state governments can best
assist this effort by providing libraries with sufficient funding to experiment with a
variety of constitutionally permissible approaches. 188
One of the more troubling aspects of the plurality decision in this case is the total absence
of any discussion of the effect CIPA’s mandate will have on local community input into
obscenity analysis. As the District Court noted, the three principal providers of filtering software
do not include, in their category definition, or in their mechanical or human website review, any
consideration of the contemporary community standards of the city or county in whose libraries
the software will be deployed. The prescient warnings of Justice Douglas in Roth, Justice Warren
in Jacobellis, and Justice Warren in Miller, that a national standard is not susceptible of
definition, were ignored by Congress in the enactment of CIPA, and by the plurality in this
decision. It remains to be seen whether Santayana’s warning will return to haunt us, and whether
this refusal to learn from the past will doom us to repeat the mess we have made of obscenity law
in cyberspace.
Justice Rehnquist next focused on the issue of whether Internet access at public libraries
qualifies for strict scrutiny analysis on the theory that in providing this access, the libraries are
serving as public fora. 189 He rejected the District Court finding in the affirmative, holding that
the principles relied on are “out of place in the context of this case.” 190 Citing the Cornelius
decision, he asserted that “Internet access in public libraries is neither a ‘traditional’ nor a
‘designated’ public forum. 191 Justice Rehnquist noted that since the Internet is a recent
development, it may not avail itself of the benefit of traditional public forum status, holding:
“The doctrines surrounding traditional public forums may not be extended to situations where
such history is lacking.” 192
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The plurality decision disregarded the District Court’s discussion of the manner in which
the Internet serves as a public forum for library patrons. The value provided to patrons by
allowing them access to chat rooms, Web hosting, and the entire panoply of interactive services
and contact with speakers all over the world is of no consequence to the Court. Instead, Justice
Rehnquist asserted that public libraries do not acquire Internet terminals in order to create a
public forum for Web publishers, just as public libraries do not acquire books to provide a forum
for the authors to speak. Access to the Internet, he argued, is provided by libraries as part of
their basic function: “to facilitate research, learning and recreational pursuits by furnishing
materials of requisite and appropriate quality”. 193 Reaching back to a 1999 Congressional report,
he noted that, “[a]s Congress recognized, ‘the Internet is simply another method for making
information available in a school or library.’ It is ‘no more than a technological extension of the
book stack.’” 194
To contemporary ears, the assertion by a the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
speaking for a plurality of the Court, that the Internet is nothing more than a technological stack
of books is both shocking and deeply disappointing. It simultaneously disregards and affirms the
concerns voiced by Professor Lawrence Lessig in his seminal works, Code and Other Laws of
Cyberspace 195 and The Future of Ideas 196 that the promise of the Internet to function as a
contemporary “commons” for the unrestricted (or at least relatively so) communication and
development of ideas, as had been afforded by traditional public forums in the past might not be
met, if over-regulation was to be its fate. 197 As Professor Lessig put it:
My central claim throughout is that there is a benefit to resources held in common and
that the Internet is the best evidence of that benefit. As we will see, the Internet forms an
innovation commons. It forms this commons not just through norms, but also through a
specific technical architecture. The Net of these norms and this architecture is a space
where creativity can flourish. Yet so blind are we to the possible value of a commons
that we don’t even notice the commons that the Internet is. And, in turn, this blindness
leads us to ignore changes to the norms and architecture of the Net that will weaken this
commons. There is a tragedy of the commons that we will identify here; it is the tragedy
of losing the innovation commons that the Internet is, through the changes that are being
rendered on top. 198
The blocking and filtering software CIPA mandates is an example of the regulation of the
Internet by architecture, or code, which is likely, over time, to adversely affect creativity and
on Forbes seems misplaced in the context of public libraries provision of Internet access for patrons. The library
staff is not responsible for the content of the Internet, and no journalistic principles are involved. Moreover, once
again the fact that the Court sees television as a medium comparable to the Internet highlights how little appreciation
or understanding the Court seems to have for the unique interactive nature of the Internet, and how that interactivity
is central to the public forum function it offers users.
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communication. It is particularly unfortunate that this restriction will likely do the greatest harm
to the segment of the population that is economically disadvantaged.
Justice Rehnquist next considered another aspect of the purpose of public libraries in
providing Internet access, which he viewed as further evidence that public forum doctrine did not
apply. He adopted the government argument, rejected by the District Court, that in offering
access to the Internet to patrons, public libraries are simply offering patrons another form of
book in the libraries collection. As he put it:
But this mistakes a public library’s purpose for acquiring Internet terminals: A library
does so to provide its patrons with materials of requisite and appropriate quality, not to
create a public forum for Web publishers to express themselves. …A library’s decision to
use filtering software is a collection decision, not a restraint on private speech. 199
The assertion that libraries do not provide Internet access to create a public forum for
Web publishers misses the point – a significant benefit libraries grant their patrons in providing
Internet access is the ability of the patrons to interact with other speakers online, as well as to
partake of the views of those speakers. Again, the Court seemed either intent on disregarding, or
unaware of, what is probably the most significant value of the Internet – its dynamic
interactivity. The qualities Justice Rehnquist ascribed to the Internet are more appropriately
descriptive of CD-ROM storage media, and not the Internet.
The concept that acquiring Internet terminals is a “collection decision” is also flawed, and
reveals another misapprehension about the nature of the Internet and Web sites and pages. In his
dissent, Justice Souter succinctly challenged the merit of this concept:
At every significant point, however, the Internet blocking here defies comparison to the
process of acquisition. Whereas traditional scarcity of money and space require a library
to make choices about what to acquire, and the choice to be made is whether or not to
spend the money to acquire something, blocking is the subject of a choice made after the
money for Internet access has been spend or committed. Since it makes no difference to
the cost of Internet access whether an adult calls up material harmful for children or the
Articles of Confederation, blocking (on facts like these) is not necessitated by scarcity of
either money or space….The proper analogy therefore is not to passing up a book that
might have been bought; it is either to buying a book and then keeping it from adults
lacking an acceptable “purpose,” or to buying an encyclopedia and then cutting out pages
with anything thought to be unsuitable for all adults. 200
Justice Souter’s argument, powerful as it is, in fact does not go far enough in describing
the effect of the deployment of filtering software under CIPA – in fact it is not as though the
library bought an encyclopedia and cut out allegedly unsuitable pages – given the “root URL”
filtering methodology used, it is more akin to the library buying an encyclopedia and removing
the S and P volumes, because “sex” and “pornography” are discussed in those volumes –
sacrificing all of the other “s” or “p” entries in the process.
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If we remove the Internet component from the discussion, the conditional grant argument
becomes harder to make given First Amendment protections – can the government, for example,
condition subsidies provided to libraries for building expenses on the libraries agreeing not to
provide patrons with copies of Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn, or Margaret Mitchell’s Gone
With the Wind, on the grounds that their portrayal of African-Americans is racist, or romance
novels, on the grounds that the portrayal of women is sexist; and in both cases, that the works are
therefore harmful to minors? The government argument in favor of this kind of conduct would
again be that it was not preventing libraries from acquiring these works – just denying subsidies
to those libraries that do make those selections. The issue here is that by targeting a particular
type of speech, the statute is content-based, which invites strict scrutiny, and distinguishes this
case from Finley or Rust, where the limitations at issue were not directed to a particular category
of speech.
In a similar vein, the plurality opinion asserted, without any supporting authority, that
libraries do not include “pornography” in their other collections, so there should be no basis for
objecting to a government program that supports that practice regarding Internet access. 201
Putting aside the questionable assumption that providing Internet access is the same thing as
adding another book to the libraries’ collection, this assumption is, with respect to the works
found in many libraries, debatable if not simply incorrect. It is likely that many citizens, shown
copies of explicit gay pulp novels or Robert Mapplethorpe photography books found in the
collections of libraries in San Francisco or New York City might disagree with the statement that
libraries do not include “pornography” in their collections. Rather, it is accurate to say that the
collections of libraries across the country reflect the contemporary community standards of the
city or county in which they are located – and that the extent of regulation they attach to Internet
access provided to their patrons should similarly be reflective of those standards – and not a
national standard mandated by the federal government, and implemented by private industry
software companies.
The final area in which the plurality opinion revealed its lack of understanding of how
software filters will work under CIPA is in its discussion of the effect of the “disabling
provision” of the Act. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
Assuming that such erroneous blocking presents constitutional difficulties, any such
concerns are dispelled by the ease with which patrons may have the filtering software
disabled….The Solicitor General confirmed that a “librarian can, in response from a
person, unblock the filtering mechanism altogether.” 202 He further explained that a patron
would not “have to explain…why he was asking a site to be unblocked or the filtering to
be disabled.,” 203 The District Court viewed unblocking and disabling as inadequate
because some patrons may be too embarrassed to request them. (citation omitted). But the
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Constitution does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a public library
without any risk of embarrassment. 204
This understanding of the viability of the disabling provision under CIPA was the key
basis for the support the plurality obtained from Justices Kennedy and Breyer in their concurring
opinions. Justice Kennedy’s entire view of the case was colored by what he understood was the
ease of implementation of this disabling provision: “If, on the request of an adult user, a librarian
will unblock filtered material or disable the Internet software filter without significant delay,
there is little to this case. The [g]overnment represents this is indeed the fact.” 205
Justice Breyer also found that the disabling provision provided significant relief from the
potential interference with the constitutional rights of library patrons:
As the plurality points out, the Act allows libraries to permit any adult patron access to an
“overblocked” Web site; the adult patron need only ask a librarian to unblock the specific
Web site or, alternatively, ask the librarian, “Please disable the entire filter”.
….
The Act does impose upon the patron the burden of making this request. But it is
difficult to see how that burden (or any delay associated with compliance) could prove
more onerous than traditional library practices associated with segregating library
materials in say, closed stacks, or with interlibrary lending practices that require patrons
to make requests that are not anonymous and to wait while the librarian obtains the
desired materials from elsewhere.
….
Given the comparatively small burden that the Act imposes upon the library patron
seeking legitimate Internet materials, I cannot say that any speech-related harm that the
Act may cause is disproportionate when considered in relation to the Act’s legitimate
objectives. 206
The plurality’s analysis of the mechanics of the “disabling provision” is flawed in several
respects. The first is the failure of the Court to consider the substantial logistical burdens the
disabling provision imposes on libraries and their staff. In order to be able to respond to patrons’
request for unblocking pages, sites or the entire filter, the library will need to have staff on duty
at all times who are familiar with the software, and are able to disable it. Library staff will also
have to keep up with the frequent updates this software, like most software, requires – incurring
204
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both the cost of purchasing updates and the training required of staff to install and run the
software. Further, each unblocking request, once implemented, requires follow-up by staff to reinstall the filter before the next patron uses the computer. In a busy urban library, with 20 or
more computers located in different parts of the library, the responsibility of keeping track of
which computer has had filtering disabled, on a single page, a single site, or the entire filter, is a
daunting logistical nightmare. The consequences of failure are also severe, since a library that
knowingly fails to maintain the filters in place, despite having certified compliance, can be
compelled to reimburse the government for any subsidies it received. 207
A second flaw in the disabling provision is that it assumes that the library patron will
know what is on the site or page which is blocked, and will therefore be able to identify for the
librarian which page or site is to be unblocked. There is no certainty that the process will be
handled this easily. To the extent sites are blocked, particularly if the blocking is done by “root
URL”, the patron may not be able to tell whether the site contains pages that the patron needs or
wants to view, or not. A patron who is doing research in an area subject to significant filtering,
ie: child pornography, may find that every site and page is blocked, and research will quickly
become impossible unless the entire filter is disabled. Justice Stevens highlighted this problem
in his dissent:
Until a blocked site or group of sites is unblocked, a patron is unlikely to know what is
being hidden and therefore whether there is any point in asking for the filter to be
removed. It is as though the statute required a significant part of every library’s reading
materials to be kept in unmarked, locked rooms or cabinets, which could be opened only
in response to specific requests. Some curious readers would in time obtain access to the
hidden materials, but many would not….Moreover, because the procedures that different
libraries are likely to adopt to respond to unblocking requests will no doubt vary, it is
impossible to measure the aggregate effect of the statute on patrons’ access to blocked
sites. Unless we assume that the statute is a mere symbolic gesture, we must conclude
that it will create a significant prior restraint on adult access to protected speech. 208
The third flaw in the plurality’s reliance on the disabling provision of the Act is that
contrary to the assurances offered by the Solicitor General in oral argument before the Court, the
Act does not allow the wholesale disabling of filters without any reason – the mere request of a
patron is not sufficient under the Act, which instead reposes discretion in the library staff to
accede to a patron’s request, upon a showing that the patron is engaged in “bona fide research” which is undefined in the statute - or for “other legal purposes” -again undefined. 209
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Finally, since the stated purpose of the Act is “[t]o protect America’s children from
exposure to obscene material, child pornography, or other material deemed inappropriate for
minors while accessing the Internet from a school or library…”, 210 there appears to be no reason,
related to that purpose, for requiring that all computers in the library, whether acquired or
operated with the use of federal funds or not, be equipped with filters if any federal subsidies are
received – including computers operated by staff and never available to patrons. The First
Amendment overbreadth considerations that motivated the District Court to find the Act facially
invalid would be eliminated if the Act was narrower in scope – for example if it required public
libraries to maintain computers dedicated to use by minors only, and which were therefore
required to apply filters, while leaving libraries to their own discretion as to the regulation
methodology to employ for adult Internet use. Justice Souter was critical of the government’s
distrust of adults and library staff in his dissenting opinion:
The statute could, in other words, have protected children without blocking access for
adults or subjecting adults to anything more than minimal inconvenience, just the way
(the record shows) many librarians had been dealing with obscenity and indecency before
imposition of federal conditions (citation omitted). Instead, the [g]overnment’s funding
conditions engage in overkill to a degree illustrated by their refusal to trust even a
library’s staff with an unblocked terminal, one to which the adult public itself has no
access. (citation omitted).
The question for me, then, is whether a local library could itself constitutionally impose
these restrictions on the content otherwise available to an adult patron through an Internet
connection, at a library terminal provided for public use. The answer is no….This would
simply be censorship…(a)s to those who did not qualify for discretionary unblocking, the
censorship would be complete and, like all censorship by an agency of the [g]overnment,
presumptively invalid owing to strict scrutiny in implementing the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment. 211
These arguments, strong as they may seem, and amply supported by the extensive
findings of fact in the District Court proceeding, were not persuasive to the plurality, and were
not enough to dissuade Justices Kennedy and Breyer from their mistaken view that the disabling
provision offered an adequate safeguard against the defects of the filtering process. But for
Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer’s misapprehension that CIPA’s disabling provision rendered
the over- and underblocking of protected expression an insignificant burden to the First
Amendment rights of library patrons, it appears that there would not have been a majority found
to support the Act. Given their support however, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality,
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found that CIPA did not induce libraries to violate the Constitution, and was a valid exercise of
Congress’ spending power, mandating the reversal of the District Court’s decision. 212
In addition to the responsive arguments previously analyzed, Justice Stevens’ dissent also
takes aim at the plurality’s support of the government view that CIPA does not penalize libraries
that do not employ filtering software – it just conditions the grant of federal funds on the use of
this software. In Justice Steven’s view, this is a bit of sophistry that will not pass muster: “An
abridgment of speech by means of a threatened denial of benefits can be just as pernicious as an
abridgment by means of a threatened penalty”. 213
Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion, offered the best summary of the error and the
consequence of the approach taken by the plurality:
There is no good reason, then, to treat blocking of adult enquiry as anything different
from the censorship it presumptively is. For this reason, I would hold in accordance with
conventional strict scrutiny that a library’s practice of blocking would violate an adult
patron’s First and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of Internet censorship, when
unjustified (as here) by any legitimate interest in screening children from harmful
material. 214
However compelling the views of the dissenters may be, the fog had returned to the
coastline, and libraries across the nation were left, in the wake of this plurality opinion, with the
question of how to implement a statute most strongly believed would cause them to violate the
First Amendment rights of their patrons.

V.

Clear Skies Peeking Through the Fog? The Library Community
Reaction to American Library Ass’n v. U.S.

Reaction by public libraries to the decision in American Library Ass’n v. U.S. has fallen
into three categories: full compliance, interpretive compliance, and refusal to comply. Libraries
that are in full compliance are those that have continued to accept federal subsidies, and have
installed filtering and blocking software systems on every computer in their library, and only
disable those filters upon request of adult patrons, for bona fide research projects or other lawful
reasons. Once disabled, filters are re-enabled for the next patron.
While there does not appear to be any comprehensive study presently available to
indicate the rate of full compliance among the nations’ public libraries, anecdotal evidence and a
small study of libraries taken shortly after the Supreme Court decision suggests that
approximately 60-70% of the libraries in the nation are in full compliance. 215 A significant factor
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in the decision to fully comply seems to be the loss of funding resulting from a refusal to
comply. The Free Library of Philadelphia, for example, is fully complying, presumably in part
so it could retain the $200,000 in federal fund subsidies it receives. 216 What is interesting from
this small study is that the cost of implementing the filters is often equal to the subsidy benefit
retained. In at least one case, the financial equation is upside down. The San Antonio Public
Library system in Texas estimated that it would lose $30,000 in federal funding if it chose not to
comply with CIPA, however it also estimated that the cost of licensing and maintaining the
software would be $35,000, and that it would also incur up to $500,000 in additional staff costs
to hire staff for managing the filter systems. 217
The second category of response, what I call interpretive compliance, refers to an
interesting response to CIPA, following the Supreme Court decision. In its press release
immediately following the announcement of the Court’s decision, the President of the ALA and
the Executive Board of the Association asserted that the decision meant: “The law is
constitutional only if the mandated filters can be disabled upon the request of adult library users.
Users do not have to explain why they are making the request.” 218
This interpretation of the decision is based on the plurality’s reliance on the advice of the
Solicitor General, which was relied on by the plurality, and by concurring Justices Kennedy and
Breyer, as has been discussed, supra. 219 Based on the field reports compiled by the ALA, it
appears to be the basis of the approach taken by one New York library, where adult patrons, after
certifying their adult status, may instruct the library as to whether they wish to have filters turned
on or off, and their preference is saved in the library computer system, and automatically
triggered each time they log on, without any further involvement of library staff. 220
This interpretive compliance may also skew the results of any survey of CIPA
compliance. Even though the statute mandates that the filters remain on for adult patrons and
may only be removed by library staff, the comments by the plurality and Justices Kennedy and
Breyer seem to be providing a basis for libraries to interpret the decision as is essence rewriting
and expanding the disabling provision of the law to allow adult patrons to elect to disable the
filters on their own. Hence, we find an article by the Director of the Carroll County (Maryland)
Public Library discussing the decision of the library, which had previously used voluntary
filtering of its Internet access, to continue the practice under CIPA: “With the CIPA ruling I
think the basic filter will remain throughout the system. Adult patrons can choose to turn off the
filter for their entire session, but the filter will automatically resume at the start of the next
session.” 221 This interpretive compliance allows public libraries to accept E-rate and LSTA
subsidies by installing filters and either allowing them to be disabled by adult patrons at their
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discretion, or by allowing staff to disable them upon patron request, without requiring any
explanation for the request. 222
The final category of response, those public libraries that have chosen to do without
federal subsidy in order to provide unfiltered Internet access to their patrons, is in some instances
marked by a significant financial sacrifice. In a 2003 article, San Francisco City Librarian Susan
Hildreth estimated that the City’s enactment of an ordinance banning the use of filters for any
public access computer within the city limits would cost the public library $225, 000 in lost Erate subsidies. 223 If the assumption previously made, that approximately 40% of the nation’s
public libraries are going without this funding, the losses resulting from the affirmance of CIPA
are in excess of several million dollars nationwide.
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, noted that the plurality’s reversal of the
District Court did not rule out an as-applied challenge to CIPA:
If some libraries do not have the capacity to unblock specific Web sites or to disable a
filter or if it is shown that an adult user’s election to view constitutionally protected
Internet material is burdened in some other substantial way, that would be the subject for
an as-applied challenge, not the facial challenge made in this case. 224
It has, as of this writing, been over two years since the Supreme Court decision was
published. To date, there have been no as-applied challenges filed against CIPA. The reasons
for this absence of filings, one can assume, are varied. Mounting a challenge to a federal statute,
for an individual, is a daunting prospect. National organizations have little to gain in supporting
such a challenge, since its effect, even if successful, would be limited in scope to the particular
jurisdiction in which the action was filed. The interpretive compliance approach taken by many
libraries has rendered CIPA somewhat toothless for libraries that allow adult patrons to disable
the filters themselves, or allow staff to disable the filter with no questions asked. Those libraries
that have declined the subsidies have also removed themselves from the possibility of mounting
an as-applied challenge. It would appear that libraries have figured out ways to find a patch of
clear sky in this murky fog.

VI.

Conclusion

Following the District Court’s decision invalidating the Children’s Internet Protection
Act, critics of Congress’ efforts to limit access or regulate content on the Internet had reason to
celebrate – it appeared that sunlight had finally cut through the fog of judicial and legislative
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efforts to regulate online content and interaction among adults. The Supreme Court decision,
marked by a singular failure to learn from its own prior obscenity case jurisprudence and a
fundamental lack of understanding of the workings of the Internet, fulfilled Dickens’ dark vision
of the courts as the locus for the murkiest fog in the nation. The resiliency and adaptability of
our public libraries to this regrettable decision allows a little sunshine to peek through those
clouds, and fortifies us for the day when a different Congress and/or Supreme Court once again
ventures into the fog, and hopefully offers citizens a brighter horizon. •
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